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Abstract
Once hailed as a triumph for black liberation movements in the region and a role model of peace and productivity, the
Republic of Zimbabwe has since the turn of the millennium found itself spiraling into the depths of socio-economic
and developmental decay. During such time, the Mugabe administration has tarnished Zimbabwe’s once admirable
reputation as the ‘bread basket’ of Southern Africa, as well as the fortunes of the Zimbabwean people. Zimbabwe's
current economic and food crises have been described by some observers as one of Africa’s worst humanitarian
disasters and a sorrowing case of 21st century de-industrialization. These problems have been attributed, in varying
degrees, to a drought affecting the entire region, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the government’s misguided policies
and repressive use of the state apparatus, and disastrous land reforms. The objective of this investigation is to better
understand the reasons and causes of Zimbabwe’s collapse, with particular reference to the institutional nature of the
escalating crisis. Instead of hope and prosperity, the new millennium brought in despair, hunger and fear for
Zimbabweans and marked the tipping point of one of the fastest collapses of a market economy in recent history. This
investigation will primarily explore the misguided government policies, fiscal mismanagement and the breakdown of
the basic democratic and financial institutional framework that led to Zimbabwe’s paralyzed and pariah status.
Zimbabwe is an example of ‘a distorted state with barely legitimate authority structures, personalistic leaders
unconstrained by norms or institutions, and bureaucracies of poor quality,’[1] whose neopatrimonial state failures
can be instructive for other developing countries in setting their philosophical, political and economic agendas.
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Abstract: Once hailed as a triumph for black liberation movements in the region and a 
role model of peace and productivity, the Republic of Zimbabwe has since the turn of the 
millennium found itself spiraling into the depths of socio-economic and developmental decay. 
During such time, the Mugabe administration has tarnished Zimbabwe’s once admirable 
reputation as the ‘bread basket’ of Southern Africa, as well as the fortunes of the Zimbabwean 
people.  Zimbabwe's current economic and food crises have been described by some observers as 
one of Africa’s worst humanitarian disasters and a sorrowing case of 21st century de-
industrialization. These problems have been attributed, in varying degrees, to a drought affecting 
the entire region, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the government’s misguided policies and repressive 
use of the state apparatus, and disastrous land reforms. The objective of this investigation is to 
better understand the reasons and causes of Zimbabwe’s collapse, with particular reference to the 
institutional nature of the escalating crisis.  Instead of hope and prosperity, the new millennium 
brought in despair, hunger and fear for Zimbabweans and marked the tipping point of one of the 
fastest collapses of a market economy in recent history. This investigation will primarily explore 
the misguided government policies, fiscal mismanagement and the breakdown of the basic 
democratic and financial institutional framework that led to Zimbabwe’s paralyzed and pariah 
status. Zimbabwe is an example of ‘a distorted state with barely legitimate authority structures, 
personalistic leaders unconstrained by norms or institutions, and bureaucracies of poor quality,’1 
whose neopatrimonial state  failures can be instructive for other developing countries in setting 
their philosophical, political and economic agendas. 
 
                                                          
1 Kohli, Atul, State Directed Development, Princeton: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pg 15 
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Chapter 1: Background and Introduction  
 
The building blocks of a bread basket… 
 
1.1 Colonization (1888–1965): Building Rhodes to Riches 
In the 1880s, the British colonialists arrived in modern day Zimbabwe by means of Cecil Rhodes' 
British South Africa Company. In 1888, British entrepreneur, and infamous colonizer, Cecil Rhodes 
extracted mining rights from King Lobengula of the Ndebele, which he used to persuade the British 
government to grant a royal charter to his British South Africa Company (BSAC); covering what 
is today both Zimbabwe and Zambia. Through such concessions and treaties, many of which were 
deceitful, he usurped the majority of the region’s tribally held land and seized control of the 
region’s indigenous labor force and precious natural resources. In 1895 the BSAC adopted the 
name 'Rhodesia' for Zambesia, after Cecil Rhodes, and in 1898 'Southern Rhodesia' was officially 
adopted as the name for the part south of the Zambezi, later to become Zimbabwe. The part to the 
north was administered separately by the BSAC and was later named Northern Rhodesia, now 
Zambia.2 
Those most greatly affected by this upheaval were the indigenous tribes who were 
aggressively displaced and discriminated by the colonial ‘Rhodes’ administration. The two main 
native tribes, the Shona and the Ndebele, staged unsuccessful revolts (Chimurenga3) against the 
                                                          
2 Roussos, Peter. Zimbabwe: An Introduction to the Economics of Transformation, Harare: Baobab Books, 1988 
3 Chimurenga is a Shona meaning struggle. It has also been used in a broader context to describe a struggle for 
human rights, political dignity and social justice. 
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encroachment on their lands in 1896 and 1897. As resistance efforts were repressed, the turn of 
the twentieth century marked the beginning of the accumulation of white power and wealth at the 
expense of the black people’s land and rights.  
However unfair and unequal the distribution of national resources, Southern Rhodesia 
flourished, economically, for over a century and grew steadily with an abundant agricultural 
surplus thanks to its fertile land, experienced white farmers and abundant natural resources.4 
Zimbabwe was one of the most advanced and wealthy African states with its own stock exchange 
created in 1896 and one of the highest standards of living, including among the black population, 
in colonial Africa. Southern Rhodesia became an official British colony in 1923 and remained 
relatively politically stable and prosperous until the British failed regional experiment in 1953. In 
the face of African opposition, Britain joined the two parts of Rhodesia with Nyasaland (now 
Malawi) in the ill-fated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which was dominated by Southern 
Rhodesian settlers.5 Growing African nationalism and unrest, particularly in Nyasaland, forced 
Britain to dissolve the federation, conceding independence to Nsayaland and Northern Rhodesian.6 
Whites in Southern Rhodesian were angered by what they perceived as ‘British appeasement’7 of 
the black nationalists and the three countries went their separate ways in 1963. The 1960’s marked 
                                                          
4 Including coal, chromium ore, asbestos, gold, nickel, copper, iron ore, vanadium, lithium, tin, platinum group 
metals 
5 Kurotwi, Lovemore.  Zimbabwean Business: How colonialism underdeveloped Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe: 
RAE, 2004, 73 
6 For a map of present day Zimbabwe and its neighbors see Appendix A.1 
7 Europa Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the Sahara, p 1288 
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the beginning of the dissolution of colonial rule8 on the continent and Southern Rhodesia was soon 
to join the list of newly formed independent republics.9  
 1.2 UDI and civil war (1965–1979): The White on White fight 
As African-majority governments assumed control in neighboring Northern Rhodesia and 
in Nyasaland, the white-minority Rhodesia government led by Ian Smith made history by declaring 
unilateral independence from Britain on November 11, 1965. Britain immediately imposed 
sanctions, asking the United Nations to do the same, and began years of negotiations with the 
Smith administration that ended in stalemate.10 The Smith administration, boldly, declared the 
creation of the Republic of Rhodesia in 1970, which was recognized at the time only by South 
Africa’s Apartheid11 administration. Although this was seen as a suitable arrangement for the white 
minority in Rhodesia the fortunes of the black majority remained inferior and dismal and led to 
massive frustration and revolts. Over the years, the guerrilla fighting against Smith's UDI 
government intensified and a civil war ensued. Referred to as the ‘people’s war’12 as it was called, 
this civil war, was spearheaded by two rebel nationalist factions: the Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe with strong support from the Frente de Libertação de 
Mozambique (Frelimo) movement fighting the Portuguese in Mozambique as well as the People’s 
                                                          
8 Economically speaking, colonialism was first and foremost an act of political control, which led well-organized 
states with dynamic economies to establish supremacy over a variety of disorganized, poor peoples of African and 
Asian.  
9 The imperial grip of Belgium, Germany, France and Holland began to loosen throughout the African continent and 
provided tens of former colonies the opportunity to gain independence in the 1960’s.  
10 The major inter-governmental talks took place in 1966 and 1968. 
11 Apartheid, Afrikaans, directly translates into ‘separateness’ and was essentially a codified racist order that 
protected white minority interests, particularly those of the Afrikaner nationalist movement. 
12 Europa Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the Sahara, p 1287 
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Republic of China; the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo, which 
was based mainly in Zambia and received training and weaponry from the USSR.13 
For most Zimbabweans, the struggles of the later decades had been about recovering land 
and commentators have likened the guerilla war of the 1970’s to a ‘peasant uprising’.14 The 
strongly socialist training and orientation of both ZANU and ZAPU attracted the support of the 
millions of disenchanted and disenfranchised blacks and both resistance movements promised a 
more equitable distribution of the nation’s resources and the empowerment of the black majority. 
Ultimately, the civil war was unsuccessful in thwarting uncontrolled resettlement or in preventing 
the land issue from fueling further discontent.  
The political, social and economic situation deteriorated until Smith’s government was 
forced to start negotiations with the leaders of the temporarily united nationalist movements known 
as the Patriotic Front (PF).15 In March 1978, with his regime near the brink of collapse, Smith 
signed an accord with the three principle black figures (PF), led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, under 
the essential condition that the PF could guarantee safeguards for white civilians who  were 
concerned for the safety of their land and their lives. As a result of this accord, also known as the 
Internal Settlement16, ‘free’ elections were held in April 1979. The United African National 
Council (UANC) party won a majority in this election. On June 1, 1979, the leader of UANC, Abel 
Muzorewa, became the country's Prime Minister and the country's name was changed to 
                                                          
13 Military and financial support from Communist countries continued well after independence. Until the mid 1990’s 
the North Korean 5th battalion was stationed in Harare training and reinforcing Zimbabwean troops. 
14 Europa Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the Sahara, p 1287 
15 The Patriotic Front was a expedient partnership between Nkomo’s ZAPU and Mugabe’s ZANU nationalist 
movements. 
16 Turner, Barry ed. The Statesman's Year-Book 2006, London: St. Martin's Press, 2006, pg. 1388 
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Zimbabwe Rhodesia.17 The ‘Internal Settlement’ left control of the country's police, security 
forces, civil service, and judiciary in white hands. It assured whites of about one third of the seats 
in parliament. It was essentially a power-sharing arrangement, which did not amount to majority 
rule and left the black patriotic fronts unsatisfied.  
Six months later, in December 1979, the British government invited Bishop Muzorewa and 
the leaders of the Patriotic Front to participate in a constitutional conference at Lancaster House. 
The purpose of the conference was to discuss and reach agreement on the terms of an independence 
constitution, and that elections should be supervised under British authority to enable Rhodesia to 
proceed to legal independence and the parties to settle their differences by political means.18 
Henceforth, successful trilateral negotiations led to the signing of the landmark Lancaster House 
Agreement, ending the civil war.  
1.3 Independence (1980): The pitfalls of Post-colonization  
On 18 April 1980, the country attained independence and along with it a new name, 
Zimbabwe, new flag, and new government ruled primarily by ZANU. Initially Canaan Banana 
served as the first president, with Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister and Joseph Nkomo and other 
ZAPU members holding various cabinet positions.19 As early as 1982, Nkomo and his followers 
were ousted from his cabinet, sparking fighting between ZAPU supporters in the Ndebele-speaking 
region of the country and the ruling ZANU. A peace accord was negotiated in 1987, resulting in 
the permanent merger of ZANU and ZAPU into the ZANU-PF. In that same year the government 
                                                          
17 See Appendix 1.3 for a timeline of the changing sovereign titles of Zimbabwe since colonization. 
18 This meeting took place three months after the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government held in Lusaka 
from August 1–7 1979.  
19 Europa Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the Sahara, p 1288 
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amended the constitution to provide for an Executive President and abolished the office of Prime 
Minister. The constitutional changes went into effect on 1 January 1988, establishing Robert 
Mugabe as President.20 
Mugabe continued to gain power and Zimbabwe prospered despite the political turbulence 
following the constitutional amendments. Zimbabwe was a major tobacco producer and a potential 
bread basket for surrounding countries. GDP per capita (PPP21) was one of the top five on the 
continent and Zimbabwe enjoyed stable positive economic growth and large scale exports for most 
of the 1990’s. Unfortunately, cracks were beginning to show in the Mugabe regime. The budget 
deficit in the mid 1990’s began to grow out of control and in September 1995 the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) announced the nonrenewal of loans for balance-of-payments support. After 
Mugabe’s third re-election in March 1996, the private sector began to put pressure on the 
administration to enforce the reforms sought by international lenders including military and civil 
service budget cuts.22 The situation was deteriorating but, with international support and proper 
regulation, collapse could reasonably have been avoided, had it not been for the misguided and 
speedy reforms of the Mugabe administration.23 These reforms, beginning in agriculture and 
spreading to the financial and political arenas soon after, sought to address the country’s economic 
and social inequalities and the growing racial divide, but ultimately tipped Zimbabwe into an 
                                                          
20 Mugabe and his party, the ZANU-PF won every re-election until March 2008 when the ZANU-PF lost 
the parliamentary majority to the Movement for Democratic Change under Morgan Tsvangarai. 
21 PPP stands for purchasing power parity and is an adjustment to a raw GDP per capita figure that takes local 
currency buying power and exchange rate fluctuations into account. 
22 Turner, Barry ed. The Statesman's Year-Book 2006, London: St. Martin's Press, 2006, pg. 1389 
23 These tendencies are later to be explained as commonly seen traits in neopatrimonial states. 
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uncontrollable and perpetual downward spiral. The next chapter will discuss arguably the most 
damaging reforms lying at the epicenter of the looming collapse, those of land redistribution.  
Chapter 2: The Tipping Point 
2.1 The Facts about the Land Reforms and the New Millennium:  
History has shown that there is seldom an easy solution to structural imbalances in 
developing countries, which are often rooted in imperial glory and greed. The case of Zimbabwe 
exemplifies this struggle to reverse the inequities of the past by using the instruments and 
institutions of the state; a developmental approach that can be dangerous if orchestrated by the 
wrong types of state leaders. This chapter will explore the first of Zimbabwe’s institutions to be 
corrupted; that of property rights. By tracking the evolution of land legislation and its relationship 
to economic decay this chapter will demonstrate the institutional roots of the national collapse and 
illustrate that the years following 2000 were the major watershed period that precipitated a string 
of related failures. The four land-related topics that this chapter focuses on, the ‘willing-buyer 
willing-seller” program, the Land Acquisition Act, the forced seizures, and Operation 
Murambatsvina, will highlight the increasingly corrupt and biased agenda that the government 
followed in enacting land reform and provide a framework for understanding the anatomy of the 
economic collapse.  
Zimbabwe’s fragile property rights system was raised to the national agenda by Robert 
Mugabe as part of his ZANU campaign in the struggle for independence in the late 1970’s. Many 
Rafael Burde 
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experts24 argue that the establishment of widespread property rights is an ‘indispensable 
ingredient’25 in economic and social development – ‘if not the silver bullet’. Economists including, 
Hernando de Soto, argue that the reason that some countries have managed to integrate the vast 
majority of their population into the official legal system and the market economy, whilst in many 
other people remain stuck in poverty, violence and lack of education is the creation and 
enforcement of an inclusive property rights system. So if the institution of property is ‘necessary 
[in providing the] underpinnings for the rule of law along with the incentives for sustainable 
growth’26 then the Mugabe administration chose a bad staging area to start addressing the country’s 
historical inequalities. Sadly, over the course of just a few years, the Mugabe administration 
managed to destroy trust and transparency in the market and thereby damaged a critical linchpin 
behind economic and social development.27 
The origins of Zimbabwe’s land issue date back to the nineteenth century and Rhodes’ 
BSAC’s control of most of the country’s arable land. Estimates suggest that at the time of 
independence the majority of arable land in Zimbabwe belonged to about 4500 white commercial 
farmers who controlled roughly 70 percent of the country’s arable land until the early 1990’s.28 
This unfortunate legacy of colonialism fostered discontent by the black majority and the new 
majority-rule government and, unsurprisingly, became a national priority soon after 
                                                          
24 Including Hernando de Soto, President of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy 
25  Richardson, Craig, The Collapse of Zimbabwe in the Wake of the 2000-2003 Land Reforms, The Edwin Mellen 
Press, 2004, vi 
26 Richardson, xii 
27 Hammar, Amanda, Brian Raftopolous and Stig Jensen ed., Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, 
State and Nation in the Context of Crisis, Harare: Weaver Press, 2003, pg 112. For further readings: Jeffrey R., 
Bradford F. Mills, Nelson Taruvinga, Why has poverty increased in Zimbabwe?, 2002 
28 Turner, Barry ed., p 1390 
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independence.29 As early as 1980, Mugabe’s party had promised to tackle this critical issue that 
had been plaguing ‘most Zimbabweans for many decades’30 and, which was congruent with the 
ZANU-PF’s ‘stated socialist goals’.31 Mugabe held true to this promise and his preliminary 
program put into place in the beginning of Mugabe’s term as Prime Minister, circa 1982, was that 
of a "willing buyer-willing seller"32 model. Although this programmed provided de jure 
opportunity to interested black buyers, with whites making up less than 1% of the population but 
holding 70% of the country's commercially viable arable land and with most whites unwilling to 
sell, the process was slow, frustrating and largely insignificant. Additionally the restrictive 
provisions of the 1979 Lancaster Agreement prohibited direct land redistribution for a period of 
ten years so the ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ program remained in place until 1989. This was a 
frustrating time and the government’s authority was further challenged by acute land problems in 
Matabeleland, which heightened the already tense political balancing act. One factor mitigating 
the uncomfortable situation was British funding for the program and the Thatcher administration’s 
initial £44 million allocation subsidized many of governments legitimate land purchases from 
1979-1989.33  
After a decade of frustration for the millions of peasants and having his hands tied by the 
Lancaster provisions, Mugabe attempted a new approach at acquiring white land and appeasing 
his elites. In March 1992 the Zimbabwean legislature passed the Land Acquisition Act following 
the expiry of the Lancaster Agreement’s provisions.34 The acts main aim was ‘to more equally 
                                                          
29 Other sources give more prudent estimates of 50% of the arable land belonging to 6000 white commercial farmers 
(Chigara, Ben, Land Reform Policy, Ashgate Publishing, 2002, 52) 
30 Europa Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the Sahara, p 1287 
31 Ibid., p 1287 
32 Chigara, Ben, Land Reform Policy. Ashgate Publishing, 2002, 28 
33 This line of credit was cut in 1997 by British Prime Minister Tony Blair when information surfaced that the 
money was being used to purchase land for members of the ruling ZANU-PF elite rather than landless peasants.  
34 Europa Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the Sahara, p 1289 
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distribute land’ and was represented a compromise between the socialist agenda of the ZANU-PF 
and the capitalist entitled interests of the white farmers.35 Zimbabwe negotiators accepted the 
British agreement to underwrite half the costs of a resettlement program in exchange for 
guaranteeing existing property rights, but this Act still ignited the first battle in a string of bitterly 
contested disputes (both legal and physical) between the government and the powerful white-
dominated Commercial Farmer’s Union (CFU.)36 Despite these clashes, the period of 1993-2000 
saw Zimbabwe’s GDP, agricultural output and life expectancy grow leading many to believe that 
the future ‘looked bright’.37 Instead, the new millennium ushered in one of the fastest collapses of 
any developing country and tipped Zimbabwe to brink of collapse. 
The next and most devastating reforms came just after the turn of the millennium in the 
form of forced removals and forced seizures. It all started in late February 2000 when the Mugabe 
government stood idly by as a group of armed black men seized a white commercial farm by 
forcibly driving them off their property.38 This sparked a wave of similar forced seizures with the 
marauding groups often accompanied by Mugabe’s army veterans and with the tacit support of the 
government.39 In many cases the Mugabe government supported the raids by publishing a list of 
841 targeted white-owned commercial farms in the newspaper as ‘available’.40 These farms 
comprised a total of 8.3m hectares, which was destined for take-over without fair compensation.41 
                                                          
35 Raftopoulos, Brian & Tyrone Savage ed., Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, Cape Town: Institute 
for Justice and Reconciliation, Weaver Press, 2005  
36 Coldham, Simon, “The Land Acquisition Act, 1992 of Zimbabwe”, Journal of African Law, No. 1 (Spring 1993), 
p 82 
37 Richardson, 1 
38 Ibid, 3 
39 White-owned businesses in the cities also become the target of ‘invasions’. 
40 Unattributed, , “Zimbabwe to name thousands of blacks to get farms of whites”, New York Times, Dec. 30, 2001 
41 Banks, Arthur and Thomas C. Muller, ed. Binghamton, Political Handbook of the World, New  York: CSA 
Publications, 2007 
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Dozens of farm owners were killed during the chaotic three year period and it is estimated that 
nearly 400,000 people found themselves unemployed and starving with a further 1-2 million 
dependents of these workers in a similar position.42 Ultimately, the forced seizure of almost all 
white-owned commercial farms, with the stated aim of benefiting landless black Zimbabweans, 
led to over a 30% fall in all major agricultural commodity production levels and precipitated the 
collapse of the agriculture-based economy.43 The chart below clearly illustrates this dramatic drop 
in agricultural production: 
Figure A: Percentage Change in Commercial Farming Production, 2000 vs. 2003  
 
                                                          
42 The World Food Program estimated in May 2002 that retrenched farm workers and their dependents numbered 
about 825,000. 
43 Richardson, 3 
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Across a broad spectrum of products grown in different regions and by different kinds of 
producers, the average three year reduction in agricultural production was over 50 percent. 
Zimbabwe’s once abundant and diversified agricultural sector collapsed in the space of three years 
with maize, groundnuts, cotton, wheat, soybeans, coffee and sheep production shrunk by between 
50 and 90 percent by 2003.44 Zimbabwe’s production of tobacco, its second most important source 
of foreign currency, and once the second-biggest in the world, has slumped from 273m kilograms 
in 2000 to 70m in 2007. With more than half of a country’s population relying on the agricultural 
sector for sustenance or employment, the repercussions of this kind of loss were dramatic. The 
Zimbabwean government took land from legitimate land owners and, in most cases, gave it to 
those that showed unconditional support for the regime and to those that had won personal favor 
with the government instead of the poor. The Zimbabwean poor thus continued to be excluded and 
many have chosen exodus over exclusion with millions of its poor crossing the borders into 
neighboring countries. Regardless of how direct Mugabe’s role was in the removals or whether 
the program as whole was designed to reward Mugabe loyalists or not, the byproduct of the forced 
removals has been a legacy of misery and chaos permanently impressed on the Zimbabwean 
nation.  
To put the consequences of 2000-2003 in perspective, the extent and speed of the collapse 
can more easily be understood in following striking circumstances in 2003.45 (1) Life expectancy 
sharply dropped. While a baby was expected to life until 56 if born in 1993, just ten years later 
only half would make it their 35th birthday (2) Real GDP collapsed. The economy shrunk by 5 
                                                          
44 African Development Bank, Statistics, www.afdb.org 
45 The Economist, “It’s the King’s Land, Ok?” Dec. 31, 1999 
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percent in 2000, 8 percent in 2001, 10 percent in 2002 and perhaps as much as 15 percent in 200346 
(3) Agricultural output dropped to 30 percent of its former level. Half of the population faced 
starvation in 2004 when 5 years earlier Zimbabwe used to feed itself and export to others (4) The 
money supply increased dramatically, fueling 500% annual inflation (5) Zimbabwean dollars lost 
more than 99% of their value versus other hard currencies, such as the dollar, since 2000 (6) The 
government’s autocratic actions against the media and political opponents earned it the rank of 
one of the most repressive regimes in the world (7) Foreign direct investment plummeted to nearly 
zero, as anxious overseas investors transferred their funds to other, less troublesome areas of the 
globe (8) The International Monetary Fund stripped Zimbabwe of its voting rights in June 2003 
after the country failed to make timely payments; it currently owes the Fund over $273 million 
dollars. 
Despite the ghastly situation the Mugabe administration’s repression and delusionary 
policies unfortunately did not stop there. Although the reasons for and severity of the forced land 
seizures cannot be understated and their drastic consequences can easily be seen as the catalyst in 
sparking a domino effect that brought down the rest of Zimbabwe’s economic and political 
institutions in the following years there were other smaller developments in this struggle for land 
saga post 2003. One of these instances was another authoritarian attack launched by the Mugabe 
government on its opponents was the forced removals of any in the administration’s way – literally. 
Following rigged elections in 2005, the government initiated "Operation Murambatsvina,"47 a 
supposed effort to crack down on illegal markets and homes that had seen slums emerge in towns 
                                                          
46 See figure B on page 15 
47 This name loosely translates to ‘Operation Drive Out Trash’ which may signal Mugabe’s true intentions to 
forcefully remove opposition supporters and anyone that stood in his way. 
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and cities. Otherwise known as ‘Operation Restore Order’ this action was launched in May 2005 
and has been widely condemned by opposition and international figures, who charge that it has 
left a substantial section of urban poor homeless and according to UN estimates, affected at least 
2.4 million people or over 20 percent of the population48. The president said it was an effort to 
boost law and order and development and provide decent housing to the population; critics accused 
him of driving out and making homeless large sections of the urban and rural poor, who comprise 
much of the internal opposition to the Mugabe administration. Either way, the razing of "illegal 
structures" left some 700,000 people without jobs or homes by May 200649, according to UN 
estimates and seeing that the Zimbabwe government has yet to deliver any new housing for the 
forcefully removed people, the operation should rightfully be understood as a targeted attempt to 
destroy slums housing opposition supporters50. 
Figure B. Zimbabwe: Changes in GDP growth (1981-2003)  
                                                          
48 International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: Danger and Opportunity, Harare: ICG Africa Report 
49 The operation took on a different name after international criticism and become known as ‘Operation Roundup’ in 
early 2006. 
50 Zimbabwe Country Review, CountryWatch Incorporated, 2008 
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2.2 Analysis and Explanation 
As this research has demonstrated Zimbabwe’s problem stems from a history of gross 
imbalances and inequities, symptoms shared by many African developing countries. The more 
poignant question asks why it is that many post-colonial African states (and others around the 
world) managed to more smoothly and liberally integrate and advance their economies and 
societies without reversing the extremes in wealth and land distribution (think, South Africa, 
Botswana or its South American counterpart, Nicaragua) yet some leaders ignore these precedents 
and follow narrow sighted agendas. What this study is addressing is not the orientation or 
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intentions of the Mugabe government in addressing the socio-economic needs of its people but 
simply that ‘a system of accumulation that reserves its advantages and opportunities for only its 
elite’51 is bound to fail over time and that once political, legal and economic institutions have been 
sufficiently damaged or manipulated that the problems then become endemic, chronic and 
ultimately paralyzing.  
So what is the best way to explain this rapid disintegration? Some theories use a ‘house of 
cards’ explaining Zimbabwe’s demise as a sudden collapse due to a combination of simultaneous 
factors resulting in a chaotic pile of fallen cards. Some theories found this approach unsatisfactory 
and sought to find a common thread that could knit together the various aspects and problems that 
lead to Zimbabwe’s unraveling. Craig Richardson (2004) undertook such a task and after 
examining dozens of economic indicators, graphs and charts he noticed one thing that ‘jumped 
out’52 at him. Nearly every economic indicator showed some sort of collapse during or shortly 
after the year 2000.  
The chaotic implementation of the land reform mortally wounded the commercial farming 
sector, the country’s leading source of exports and foreign exchange, turning Zimbabwe into a new 
importer of food and sending the economy into a downward spiral but the connection between a 
collapse in commercial farming and the overall meltdown of the economy needs some unpacking. 
Essentially, the land seizures of 2000 proved the importance of three factors for any market 
economy, namely, land equity, trust and knowledge. The Mugabe government failed to protect 
                                                          
51 Richardson, xiii 
52 Richardson, 2 
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these building blocks of a free market and ultimately the economic and democratic institutional 
frameworks on which they were built came crashing down. 
Firstly, by wiping out billions in land equity, the land seizures made wealth creation and 
individual borrowing impossible53. The new black land owners were effectively leasing their 
‘recently acquired’ farms from the government and with no means of borrowing against their land 
(they held no titles for the land) they could not obtain loans to finance their farming operations54. 
The land seizures caused a vast constriction of borrowing, which rippled through business to 
business and sector to sector. Calculations done by Craig Richardson estimate that five billion U.S. 
dollars in wealth was wiped out from the agricultural sector, in one year, and ultimately more than 
75 percent on the entire value of all commercial farmland vanished. The result is what economist, 
Hernando de Soto, calls “dead capital”55. 
Secondly, the land seizures broke a chain of vital business knowledge. With the majority 
of the country’s productive land in the hand of people with little to none farming experience, yields 
dropped dramatically. With very little understanding about modern farming methods, the farmers 
were doomed from the start as was their sector of the economy. Considering that 60 percent of the 
manufacturing sector was directly tied to the agricultural sector, the contagion spread rapidly. 
Thirdly, the land seizures broke down the trust, confidence and perception that the rules of 
the marketplace would be fairly enforced by the government. The rule of law was willfully ignored 
                                                          
53 Ibid, 5 
54 The link between land equity and market growth was unfortunately illustrated recently in the United States where a 
revaluation of the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States led to a crisis in the credit market and ultimately a 
sharp slowdown in growth and wealth creation. 
55 Richardson, 5 
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by the Mugabe Government, even after the land reforms were declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court. This marked a much more serious violation than previous government abuses and 
infringements as it set a dangerous precedent. This was the first time that the executive branch of 
government had directly condoned the expropriation of private property, and there was nothing 
that the judicial branch could do. The erosion of people’s trust in the rule of law soon spread to the 
stock and real estate markets and foreign direct investment plummeted an astonishing 99 percent 
from 1998-200156. A breakdown in trust and confidence in the institutional frameworks made 
Zimbabwe an unattractive place for both foreign and domestic capital and signaled the beginning 
of the end for this ‘risky’ dictatorship57. The country had reached a tipping point and it was the 
land reforms that sent them over the edge. To illustrate this explanation graphically see the chart 
below for a schematic of the relationship between property rights and GDP growth. 
Figure C: The Relationship between Property Rights and GDP Growth58 
                                                          
56 The official FDI into Zimbabwe fell from $443 million in 1998 to a mere $5 million in 2001. 
57 Zimbabwe’s risk profile escalated dramatically as the World Bank changed its risk premium on investment in 
Zimbabwe from 3.4% in 2000 to 20.4% in 2001. The severity of the financial problems become palpable if one 
compares them to the reaction when the US Fed cuts interest rates by a quarter percent or inflation rises by a 
percentage point. 
58 Source: Richardson,  9 
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For many of the reasons illustrated above, the remaining sectors of the Zimbabwean 
economy were soon to share a similar unfortunate fate as agriculture and manufacturing. Quickly 
the mining and tourism sectors overtook agriculture as the leading sources of foreign currency 
inflows but they too collapsed due to an overvalued currency, a rapidly declining tourist base and 
the general distrust and lack of confidence in the economy. Ultimately, the data suggests that of 
all the possible causes attributed to Zimbabwe’s failures, the 2000-2003 land reforms and the 
erosion of an enforceable property rights system had the most significant and widespread impact 
and, along with other institutional failures, lie at the root of the subsequent national collapse. With 
the help of the visual below, the string of events and consequences created by the 2000-2003 land 
reforms can be readily understood.  
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The visual on the next page neatly summates the series of events that followed the 2000 
land reforms and neatly lists the impacts, which ranged from an increases in AIDS infections to 
new financial regulations to the emergence of a black or parallel market for certain necessary 
goods. The picture was bleak but the situation was still going to get worse and while the land 
reforms were at the heart of the failures there were many more mistakes and misguided policies to 
follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D. Zimbabwe: The Anatomy of Collapse59 
                                                          
59 Source: Richardson, 10 
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Chapter 3: The Present 
 
The world’s worst… 
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This chapter will expose the harsh realities of present day Zimbabwe and highlight the 
severity of the problems. When compared to its neighbors and viewed from an international 
development perspective the overall failure of Zimbabwe’s regulatory institutions and the 
complete decay of liberal markets may become more tangible. There has not been a case of a 
country, to the best of my knowledge, in the past fifty years, whose fortunes, prospects and 
prosperity have dropped so quickly to the extent that journalists are calling this a case of "de-
industrialization" and “an economic catastrophe”.60 
Endowed with rich mineral assets, an educated workforce, and beautiful natural wonders, 
Zimbabwe seemed poised to be an African success story. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe went from a 
place of hope to one of the grimmest places on earth in the space of just a few years. The shortages 
and oppression suffered by the Zimbabwean people, today, are of biblical proportions and the 
systematic series of misguided reforms and institutional failures on behalf of the Mugabe regime 
buried its people in despair and poverty. Zimbabwe is currently hyperinflation and chronic 
shortages in fuel and consumer goods61 and left the majority of its population on the brink of 
survival. The damage is so pervasive and contagious that Zimbabwe has consistently been at the 
bottom of most lists of global development reports across most economic indicators continually 
                                                          
60 Kriger, Norma, ‘From Patriotic Memories to ‘Patriotic History’ in Zimbabwe, 1990 – 2005’, Third World 
Quarterly, (Sep 2006), Vol. 27 (6), p1159 
61 The author experienced these shortages and the desperation of even the wealthy in Zimbabwe during a trip he took 
to Harare in July 2007. He was asked my members of his family to bring some basic consumer goods and food stuffs 
with him. Necessities like dishwashing liquid and olive oil could not be found in Harare and some luxury items like 
quality brand chocolate and comfort foods simply were not stocked in any shops in Harare. 
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setting new record lows and the evidence in this chapter paints a picture of one of the world’s 
worst places.62 
A closer look at Zimbabwe’s economic and development indicators over the past eight 
years paints an equally dismal picture. To illustrate the consequences of Mugabe’ economic 
mismanagement and fiscal irresponsibility, according to the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund the percentage of Zimbabwe’s population living below poverty line increased from 
around 50 percent 1999 to over 80 percent 2004 and GDP per capita dropping from US$2440 in 
2000 to just $340 in 2007 dropping Zimbabwe from a lower-middle income country to a lower 
income country according to World Bank classifications.63 The official unemployment figures 
estimate over 80 percent unemployment in 2008 meaning that over 9 million Zimbabweans are 
stuck in a ‘poverty trap’64 reinforced by lack of credit, jobs, currency or food.65 These kinds of 
statistics, placing Zimbabwe in the lowest ten percent of countries worldwide, are usually only 
witnessed in countries experiencing traumatic civil war, regime change or a disaster of some sort.66  
One indicator that has received worldwide attention and scrutiny is the current 
hyperinflation paralyzing the Zimbabwean economy. By definition inflation is simply a price 
index, which changes as a result of a change in a country’s money supply relative to the production 
capacity of goods and services or as a result of a changes in the specific price of certain goods and 
                                                          
62 IRIN (News Agency), Zimbabwe: ‘Rural conditions now apply in the capital’, 2 August 2007 
63 World Bank, The, Country Brief: Zimbabwe, 2007 
64 Sachs, Jeffrey D. The End of Poverty. Penguin Books, 2006,  pg 23 
65 Zimbabwe’s unemployment rate is currently the third highest in the world, only behind the countries of Liberia  
(population 3 million) and Nauru (population 13000). This is striking given the size (13.1 million people) and 
relative development of Zimbabwe. Related article: Associated Press, Bleak Christmas for Zimbabweans, January 
2008 
66 Marawanyika, Godfrey, Zimbabweans Shun Banks after Cash Shortages, Harare: Agent France- Presse, 13 
January 2008 
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services.67 This research has touched on the massive capital flight and drying up of foreign direct 
investment and given last chapter’s lengthy discussion of the damage done to production capacity, 
a surge in Zimbabwe’s inflation seemed unavoidable. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe started 
aggressively printing money in 2001 because the credit markets dried up and tax revenues were 
down as a result of the illegal squatters and land redistribution (See implications on money supply 
below). 
Figure E: Zimbabwe Money Supply Growth: 1997 – 2002 (in millions of Z$)68 
 
The effect on inflation was immediate. The official annual inflation rate reported by the 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) in 1999 was 59 percent. Despite being about ten times greater 
than an average Western developed country’s inflation, the market still functioned efficiently at 
                                                          
67 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index homepage, URL: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ 
68 Source: Richardson, 105 
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this level, consumer goods were readily available and the exchange rate allowed Zimbabweans to 
trade and travel with relative ease.  
Figure F: Exponential Inflation in Zimbabwe: 1995-2008 
 
The situation deteriorated very rapidly and the inflation rate rose exponentially even on a 
monthly basis after the year 2000 (See Figure F below for the visual proof). By 2001 inflation had 
surpassed 100 percent, increasing to 384 percent by 2003 before reaching 977 percent by the end 
of 2007. Effectively something that cost Z$5 in January 2007 now cost Z$50 by the end of the 
year. To illustrate the absurdity of daily life in Zimbabwe, a tank of gas, when available, costs an 
estimated Z$1.3 billion and with the absence of a banking system this must be paid for in cash. A 
simple can of Coca Cola will cost over a Z$1 million meaning that everyone is forced to carry 
around briefcases, sometime suitcases of money.69 It is hard to imagine a system or society that 
could tolerate this stresses and in 2008 hyperinflation set in and the inflation rate skyrocketing to 
                                                          
69 For a list of daily prices, in July 2007, see Appendix A.4 
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numbers not seen since the 1920’s in Germany. Zimbabwe officially has the world’s worst 
inflation and in February 2008 it was reported at 100520 percent or roughly a 275 percentage 
average increase in the daily price of goods.70  
The next category in which Zimbabwe leads the pack of losers is life expectancy. Life 
expectancy at birth for males in Zimbabwe has dramatically declined since 1990 from 60 to 36 in 
2007, the lowest in the world. Life expectancy for females is even lower at 34 years, going from 
the highest in sub-Saharan African to over ten years below the sub-Saharan average in the space 
of under a decade.71  
Figure G: Life Expectancy in Zimbabwe: 1995 - 2009(est.) 
 
                                                          
70 Reuters, “Zimbabwe inflation reaches new record” Feb. 21, 2008 
71 World Bank, Data and Research Indicators 
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Concurrently, the infant mortality rate has climbed from 53 to 81 deaths per 1,000 live 
births in the same period. It is estimated that 5.6 million Zimbabweans live with HIV72, nearly half 
the population and many have point to this as the major cause of Zimbabwe’s woes.73 According 
the United Nations Health Program, the estimated percentage of the population infected with 
HIV/AIDS was 20.5 percent in 2007.74 This is the fourth highest infection rate in the world behind 
Zimbabwe’s fellow sub-Saharan countries of Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho. Basic health 
services have nearly ceased to exist with surgical operations in the biggest hospital having to be 
cancelled because basic equipment is defunct and drugs have run out. Three-quarters of the doctors 
have emigrated, along with more than half the nurses, physiotherapist and social workers. Patients 
seeking operations and medical treatment must buy medicine themselves.75  
Ultimately, life is a struggle for survival. Both Zimbabwean citizens as well as the Mugabe 
regime are battling to survive in this poisonous environment. The government is paralyzed by one 
of the highest external debt ratios in the world, which stood at 132 percent in 2005 making it 
impossible for it to fulfill its obligations or balance budgets. The country’s once bulging gross 
domestic product fell to just over $3 billion in 200676, using the official exchange rate calculation, 
                                                          
72 Meldrum, Andrew, Where we have Hope: a Memoir of Zimbabwe, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press (1), 2004, 9 
73 See section 4.5 for an explanation of why the HIV/AIDS epidemic is not the root cause of Zimbabwe’s crisis. 
74 UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2006, UNDP 
75 The Economist “Coming to a Crunch” March 22, 2008 
76 The exact figure is  $3.146 billion and A nation's GDP at official exchange rates (OER) is the home-currency-
denominated annual GDP figure divided by the bilateral average US exchange rate with that country in that year. The 
measure is simple to compute and gives a precise measure of the value of output. Many economists prefer this measure 
when gauging the economic power an economy maintains vis-à-vis its neighbors, judging that an exchange rate 
captures the purchasing power a nation enjoys in the international marketplace. Official exchange rates, however, can 
be artificially fixed and/or subject to manipulation - resulting in claims of the country having an under- or over-valued 
currency - and are not necessarily the equivalent of a market-determined exchange rate. Moreover, even if the official 
exchange rate is market-determined, market exchange rates are frequently established by a relatively small set of 
goods and services (the ones the country trades) and may not capture the value of the larger set of goods the country 
produces. Furthermore, OER-converted GDP is not well suited to comparing domestic GDP over time, since 
appreciation/depreciation from one year to the next will make the OER GDP value rise/fall regardless of whether 
home-currency-denominated GDP changed. 
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equating to just one percent of the GDP of neighboring South Africa. Trade deficits rose to 
astronomical levels, and like many other economic variables, Zimbabwe’s exchange rate against 
the US dollar reached six figures. Back in 1980 the Zimbabwean dollar was stronger than the US 
dollar however in 2008 the black market rate was around Z$250,000 to US$1.77 Ultimately, there 
was profound weakness in the domestic economy and the state, with its neopatrimonial tendencies, 
attempted to undertake economic activities directly to fill the vacuum. Given the state’ non-
developmental proclivities and organizational weakness, efforts to produce and regulate goods in 
the public sector or remedy economic crises failed. The alternatives if importing goods or attracting 
foreign investment, as will be shown in the next chapter, would have make sense but were foregone 
due to Mugabe’s self-imposed isolation and a lack of alternatives sources of demand and income.78 
Many questions remain: (1) how did the situation get this bad? (2) Why was the collapse 
so systematic and so rapid? And (3) what could have been done to prevent this from occurring? 
These are the issues that will be dealt with in chapter 4 in examining the institutions reasons for 
the collapse and exploring what were the true causes of the systematic failure. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 The Economist “Coming to a Crunch” March 22, 2008 
78 Kohli, 15 
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Chapter 4: The Real Reasons for the Collapse  
 
 
4.1 The Institutional Nature of the Collapse 
The world has witnessed instances of imperfectly executed land redistribution programs 
before (England, Canada and Australia) and economic and development conditions have 
deteriorated close to the extent that they did in Zimbabwe in other developing countries but what 
makes the case of Zimbabwe unique is the systematic institutional collapse and perversion of all 
major regulatory bodies and checks and balances at the expense and isolation of the Zimbabwean 
people. One way to describe this type of state that intervened heavily in its economy, but with 
disastrous effects is that of a ‘neopatrimonial state’. Atul Kohli, a professor of Politics at Princeton, 
argues in State Directed Development79 that neopatrimonial states have often emerged in societies 
with weak private sectors, but instead of strengthening the private sector, these states have 
appropriated scare economic resources and diverted them everywhere but toward productive 
investment. These states are neopatrimonial because, despite the façade of a modern state, public 
officeholders tend to treat public resources as their personal patrimony (see section in Chapter 2 
on forced seizures).  
“They are often not really modern; rational-legal states [see section 1.2 and section 4.3 for a 
description of some legislative and judicial abuses]. [Generally speaking,] whether organized as a 
nominal democracy or as a dictatorship [the case not being so clear in Zimbabwe], state-led 
development under the auspices of neopatrimonial states has often resulted in disaster, mainly 
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because both public goods and capacities to pursue specific tasks in these settings have repeatedly 
been undermined by personal and narrow group interests.”80  
A widely cited example of this state typology is that of Nigeria, which encapsulates how 
the ill-designed setup and operations of the state can lead to economic stagnation and 
underdevelopment in a very resource rich country. Likewise this section will illustrate Zimbabwe’s 
the inconsistent economic policies, failure to support indigenous capitalists, poor-quality but 
activist labor, and political instability. The Zimbabwean state usurped control and dominance over 
both societal and state institutions by means of significant organized power, as well as organized 
coercion to centralize their control and serve their minority interests. These minority interests 
included those within Mugabe’s ruling elite, high ranking military and government officials and 
massively favored Mugabe’s native tribe – the Ndebele. Tribalism has often been associated with 
neopatrimonial states (as too was the case in Nigeria) giving preferential treatment to those 
members of the tribe over rivals and using the state’s resources to empower and enrich its leaders. 
Furthermore, neopatrimonial states tend to have a weak sense of public purpose, such that ideology 
does not play a very significant role.81 Pronouncements of public goods are usually cloaks for the 
pursuit of personal and sectional interests.82 The organizational underpinning of neopatrimonial 
states also tends to be underdevelopment: Much of politics tends to be ‘preclass, interest groups 
are often not well organized, and public bureaucracies lack competence and professionalism’.83 
These factors are all found to be evident in Zimbabwe and it is as a neopatrimonial state that the 
collapse of Zimbabwe can best be understood. The following sections will explore how the ZANU-
                                                          
80 Kohli, 9 
81 Ibid, 13 
82 Dashwood, Hevina S., Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transformation, Toronto; Buffalo: University of 
Toronto Press, 2000, 28 
83 Kohli, 22 
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PF abused and mismanaged the state apparatus and held a violent monopoly over all aspects of life 
leading to economic collapse and suffering in a resource rich country.84   
A collapsed agricultural sector and negative economic growth are not particularly unique 
to Zimbabwe and have been witnessed across Africa and the developing world but many of these 
countries still survive and stabilize thanks to international development efforts and the conditions 
related to that aid regarding good governance and sound economic management. The dismal 
situation described in Chapter 3 could have been prevented or at least mitigated had some of the 
state’s organizations and institutions not been bend around the will and needs of Mugabe and his 
sectional interests.85 This chapter will first explore how and why Zimbabwe became completely 
isolated from the international community and how the state perverted all of its organizations with 
a self-serving bias and ill-designed policies leading to what some have labeled “an institutionalized 
dictatorship”.86 The later sections of this chapter will address some of the most widely cited 
singular factors for the collapse and describe why each of these causes, from drought to HIV to 
the personality of Robert Mugabe, were supplementary to the primary institutional decay and 
hence inability of the state to remedy or mitigate the ensuing collapse. 
There are many institutions that are needed to create a well functioning, balanced and 
healthy state. Some of these include (1) a well enforced property rights system, (2) a free and 
independent press, (3) fundamental democratic procedures and values (4) free and independent 
judicial and legislative system, (5) rational economic and fiscal policy and (6) an appropriate level 
                                                          
84 For a visual timeline of the major periods in Zimbabwe’s history and significant policies that severely negatively 
affected the country, see Appendix A.3 
85 For an insight into the inadequacy of the government to set proper agenda and budgets see Government of 
Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe: Towards Sustained Economic Growth: Macro-economic  Framework for 2005-2006, 2004 
86 This is how Morgan Tsvangaria, leader of the opposition party categorized the Mugabe regime in July 2005. 
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of integration into global capital markets. This section will demonstrate, in turn, how each one of 
these elements were manipulated and perverted by an autocratic state from 2000 to present. 
The first of these elements has been previously covered and for a full description of the 
destruction of the property right system in Zimbabwe following the land reforms and its connection 
to economic decline, see Chapter 2. Chapter 3 uncovered the extent of the crisis however at the 
same time that the economy was coming off its proverbial tracks, so journalistic and political 
freedoms were being crushed.  
 
4.2 The Press under Oppression                
The second of these elements, a free and independent press, began to be eroded in 2001 
and the overall ill-treatment of the press, both foreign and domestic, escalated to the point that 
observers now categorize Zimbabwe as one of the most repressive regimes in the world.87 In its 
continual battle for control and power the government launched an autocratic and repressive 
campaign against the media and political opponents shortly after the land reforms of 2000. The 
country’s only independent daily newspaper with readership of over 1 million people, the Daily 
News, was routinely raided, threatened and in 2001 its printing presses were bombed before being 
forcefully closed down in September 2003.88 The BBC and CNN are officially banned and even 
bloggers have been threatened and punished for publishing content criticizing the government 
meaning that there has not been a free and fair election in Zimbabwe since 2000. Control of the 
press took on a legal form when the Access to Information and Privacy Act was passed in early 
                                                          
87 For the most recent Freedom House rankings for Zimbabwe see Appendix A.7 
88 Darnolf, Staffan and Lisa Laakso ed., Twenty years of independence in Zimbabwe: from liberation to 
Authoritarianism, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 245 
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2002 requiring all journalists working in the country to seek approval from the state. By June 2002 
more than 10 journalists had been detained and the remaining foreign journalists were expelled. 
The independence and freedom of the press, something most theories hold to be essential for a 
functioning neo-liberal state has all but been demolished and replaced by the biased use of national 
instruments for propagandist agendas against so called ‘enemies of the state’.89 Zimbabwe’s 
‘fourth estate’90 has been corrupted along with so many of Zimbabwe’s previously sophisticated 
institutions taking with it any checks and balances that it may have provided for the executive or 
legislative branches. After being arrested for committing journalism an American journalist had 
this to say after his recent release from a Harare jail: “The veneer of freedom Mr. Mugabe permits 
the press is applied with the thinnest of coats”.91  
 
4.3 Democratic Institutions and the March 29, 2008 Elections  
This contagion soon spread to the political sphere and democracy, and its institutions, soon 
became tools in the Mugabe arsenal against its enemies. Every election since June 2000 has been 
marred by the imprisonment and torture of political opponents92, the use of scare tactics by the 
ZANU-PF, and the alleged rigging of election results. Ultimately, the coercive apparatus of the 
state destroyed the democratic institutions. Basic human rights were ignored and democratic values 
plundered in every election. Police approval was needed for a gathering of more than three people, 
MDC supporters were often targets of physical attack, and activists were routinely arrested and 
                                                          
89 Norman, Andrew, Robert Mugabe and the Betrayal of Zimbabwe, Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2004 
90 The term Fourth Estate refers to the press, both in its explicit capacity of advocacy and in its implicit ability to 
frame political issues. The term goes back at least to Thomas Carlyle in the first half of the 19th century. 
91 Bearak, Barry, ‘Jailed in Zimbabwe: A Reporter’s Ordeal’, New York Times, April 27, 2008 
92 Leader of the opposition, Morgan Tsvangarai, was famously beaten close to death by the henchmen of the Law 
and Order Ministry on 11 March 2007. 
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detained. The so-called Independent Electoral Commission, led by an army officer and mostly 
staffed by military personnel, was not autonomous. The MDC was not allowed to inspect any of 
the election voters’ roll, but claimed that two million of the six million names on it were of ‘ghost’ 
voters.93 This year’s, March 29, elections witnessed another round of intimidation, rigging and 
governmental tampering. 
The March 29 elections were the first time in over 25 years that ground breaking change 
could be in store for Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s main opponents in the elections, Simba Makoni, a 
former finance minister and ZANU-PF member and Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the main 
opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), were well positioned to give 
Mugabe his toughest political fight yet. Mr. Tsvangirai only narrowly lost the 2005 elections, 56% 
to 44%, in an electron fraught with intimidation, violence and complete control of the media. 
Estimates by the Mass Public Opinion Institute predicted Mr. Tsvangirai winning 28% of the vote, 
Mr. Mugabe 20% and Mr. Makoni 9%. Nearly a quarter of the population, 24%, refused to reveal 
a preference, illustrating how institutionalized repression and fear have become in Zimbabwean’s 
minds, and 8% were undecided.94 Many were hoping for change; a change in leadership, a change 
in their fortunes, a change in their living conditions and a change in Zimbabwe’s reputation.  
The results of the March 29 elections were initially a ‘miracle’ and although no official 
results were announced until weeks after the elections preliminary reports Tsvangirai’s MDC had 
won 113 of 210 parliamentary seats giving it the majority it needed to win the elections and claim 
parliamentary, if not presidential, victory.95 The unofficial results reported by the Zimbabwean 
                                                          
93 Timbe, Augustine Mano, Democracy in Emergent States: Case Study of Zimbabwe and Other Developing 
Countries, Harare: 2007 
94 The Economist, “Coming to A Crunch” March 22, 2008 
95 Time,  “Zimbabwe Ponders Life after Mugabe”, 1 April, 2008  
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Electoral Commission show Morgan Tsvangirai with 50.4%, Mugabe with 43.7 and the 
independent, Simba Makoni, with 7% of the 2.3 million votes cast.96 A peaceful exit by Mugabe 
was unimaginable until the months leading up to the March elections but reports from high level 
ZANU-PF officials suggest that negotiations are taking place between MDC and ZANU-PF that 
would save Mugabe from international prosecution by human rights agencies and the Hague for 
the crimes his regime committed in return for a peaceful acceptance of the majority vote and a 
quite exit from power. The Zimbabwean Politburo began drafting emergency rebuilding and 
reform strategies, which the international community estimate will cost over US$1 billion per year 
for many years to come.97 Mugabe is still clinging to his seat in power despite national and 
international clamor for him to step down and the next few months will be a watershed time in 
Zimbabwe’s history. Until the state’s vice-like grip on the country is loosened and transparency, 
trust, and a market system returns to Zimbabwe the problems will not be solved.  
 
4.4 Judicial and Legislative Abuses  
The fourth element needing exploration is the health and independence of the judicial and 
legislative systems in Zimbabwe. Here too, it will be shown, that these branches of government 
unfortunately also fell into the hands of state directed manipulation. In keeping with the perversion 
associated with a neopatrimonial state, variations in Zimbabwe’s basic authority structure were a 
product of three sets of competing influences capable of such decisive political intervention: 
                                                          
96 Although the media has not focused as much on the campaign of Simba Makoni, his brave decision to break away 
from his ZANU-PF cronies and run as an independent against an oppressive regime may have stolen just enough votes 
away from Mugabe to tip the MDC over the crucial 50% mark that prevented a run-off ballot. These heroic acts should 
not go unmerited and Mr. Makoni should be welcomed into a new government whose main task is to piece together 
the broken fragments of Zimbabwe’s once healthy democratic and financial frameworks and inject a glimmer of hope 
into the average Zimbabwean’s life. 
97 Reuters, ‘Zimbabwe reconstruction $1 billion a year-UK’, April 3, 2008 
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colonialism, nationalist movements, and coercive politics of national armed forces.98 Zimbabwe’s 
history incorporates all of these malevolent factors each of which influenced and changed the 
state’s balance of power and abusing many legislative and judicial standards and practices along 
the way. For instance, the instigators of the 2000-2003 land invasions, despite being found guilty 
of trespassing and illegal squatting, were never brought to justice Instead the judicial system was 
used to harass the opposition. Many judges were forced into early retirement because of their 
unwillingness to comply with the state’s demands and pressures. With the rule of law all but gone, 
civil society nearly collapsed and the fear forced out most people that could leave the country. It 
is estimated that the white population in Zimbabwe had fallen from 200,000 in 2000 to around 
25,000 in 2005. The United States foreign policy statement in May 2006 belittled Mugabe’s 
governance as “illegitimate and irrational”99. Mugabe manipulated laws for his political purposes 
as was the case in 2001 when Libyan president Col. Muhammar al-Qaddafi was allowed to give a 
large donation to the ZANU-PF, funds for the forthcoming presidential election, although, 
ironically, Zimbabwean law had recently been changed to prohibit foreign funding of political 
parties.100  
In 2005 when the ZANU-PF captured the two-thirds majority of parliament, needed to 
make constitutional amendments, the full force of the state came down on any opponents. Now 
land owners were denied the right to appeal the expropriation of their land, it empowered 
government officials to confiscate passports, in the interest of national security, with no right to 
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appeal. Nowadays, the police have the freedom to make arrests based on creative charges ranging 
from ‘dangerous parking’ to’ failure to stop for the President’s motor cavalcade in a timely 
fashion’.101 Notwithstanding the plethora of new amendments and laws aimed at protecting the 
President’s personal and tribal interests, Mr. Mugabe has reaped significant financial benefits 
during his reign as ‘Right Honorable President of the Republic of Zimbabwe’. His family’s 
personal complex in downtown Harare is said to have cost over US110 million (the equivalent of 
nearly 4% of GDP)102 and all cameras are banned within two blocks of the property. The head of 
Zimbabwe’s Law Society, and leading human rights lawyer, openly states that “ultimately, there 
is no law in Zimbabwe” adding that “he law only applies when it serves the perpetuation of the 
state”.103 So with severely diminished confidence is their corporate, constitutional, property, legal 
or human right Zimbabwean society began to crumble.104  
 
4.5 Fiscal and Economic Mismanagement and Isolation  
The last two elements will be dealt with in conjunction as they are related to one another 
and vital in explaining the uncontrollable demise of the country. The economic woes of Zimbabwe 
are rooted in the ideological shift that took place after independence, moving from a Western 
                                                          
101 The author was arrested for the charge of dangerous parking in July 2007 and evaded custody by bribing his way 
out of jail for Z$500,000 (~US$4). These charges apply to citizens and visitors alike and no pardon is given if one 
should not be familiar with the bylaws surrounding how and when one should immediately stop if one sees the 
Presidential cavalcade approaching. This is indicative of the level of paranoia and fear that the president lives and 
the measures he is willing to take to protect himself from his own people. 
102 Mumbengegwi, Clever ed., Macroeconomic and Structural Adjustment Policies in Zimbabwe, New York: 
Palgrave, 2002, xxi, p 308 
103 Quote from Beatrice Mtetwa taken from Barry Bearak’s Jailed in Zimbabwe: A Reporter’s Tale, New York 
Times, 27 August 2008 
104 Simultaneously Zimbabwe’s built environment began to decay with infrastructural collapse lagging the institutional 
crises. Basic public services are unreliable with the electricity in Harare frequently off: the main transformer is broken. 
Water is some of the poorer townships has not flown for since 2005. And as The Economist so delicately put it: “The 
only thing multiplying, apart from the noughts on the bank notes are pot-holes in what used to be Africa’s smoothest 
roads north of the Limpopo river”104. 
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capitalist paradigm to a socialist inspired party commanding the controlling heights of the 
economy.105 The ZANU-PF and its leadership’s socialist tendencies, many having been trained in 
communist-inspired camps or bases in Tanzania, China or Russia, were inevitable going to inform 
some new public policy and the economic agenda. Unfortunately, without effective organizations, 
neopatrimonial states tend to lack developmental power and are rarely capable of defining and 
setting economic goals, as was the case in Zimbabwe.106 Understandably, the waves of new 
policies and priorities adopted by the ZANU-PF had mixed results and although the black majority 
enjoyed equal rights and improved civilian benefits (education, social mobility and job access) the 
private sector was opposed to this new competition and many white professionals and 
multinationals left the country after independence. This capital flight and brain drain forced 
Mugabe to reluctantly loosen control over the economy and revise the country’s investment 
guidelines in the 1980’s after this surge of divestment. The ZANU-PF relatively loosened control 
over the economy until 2000 and the previously mentioned land reforms. Instead of finding 
solutions to the ensuing crises the government became increasingly inflexible and self-serving.  
Economic resources controlled by the state were put to corrupt use and ended up in the 
hands of elites for private consumption, leading to failed efforts at state development.107 Moreover, 
politically connected individuals were allowed to prosper in a crumbling market after the land 
reforms. Houses in the northern suburbs of Harare were sold for Z$50,000m (US$50,000) when 
the average monthly salary was Z$20m (US$20), and the monthly cost of a basic food basket for 
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a family of six was Z$60 (US$600).108 Due to the ensuing collapse of the banking and foreign 
currency markets shortages surged in all imported items, including, fuel, electricity, medicines, 
schoolbooks, machinery and spare parts. Corruption took hold of all branches of government and 
despite publicly acknowledging the existence of corruption, arrogance and maladministration in 
July 1999 the Mugabe government began using more and more of its resources to reign in the 
unraveling economy.109 Some in the administration were aware of the inconsistencies and self-
serving bias of the regime. The Governor of the Central Bank of Zimbabwe, Gideon Gono, was 
among the few who acknowledged that the problems the country faced were in part caused by 
corruption but nothing changed and the balance of power continued to shift towards the state. 
Zimbabwe’s isolation began in June 2002 when it was suspended from the Commonwealth 
of Nations on charges of human rights abuses during the land redistribution and of election 
tampering. At a time when Zimbabwe desperately needed international support Mugabe 
intentionally isolated the country from what he considered “racist colonialists” institutions and 
rejected any form of assistance from so-called ‘white’ Western governments of development 
organizations.110 “In abandoning the basic values of the Commonwealth—democratic institutions 
and good governance, basic human rights and the rule of law, ironically enunciated most 
graphically in the independence of Zimbabwe and in the landmark Harare declaration of 1991 —
Mugabe has seriously jettisoned the well-being of his people and spurned the friendship of the 
outside world. It is not surprising that this man, who could have entered legend as an African hero, 
has lost the confidence of his Commonwealth colleagues and that consequently Zimbabwe 
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removed itself from the Commonwealth in 2003”.111 Thanks to staggering balance of payments 
and current account deficits and an inability to repay its loans Zimbabwe was then suspended from 
the IMF in February 2007 because it had still failed to reform its broad mismanagement of the 
economy and trim its ‘bloated and inefficient civil service, massive budget deficits and souring 
inflation rate’.112 The tragedy is that Zimbabwe’s economic policies were inadequate to fix the 
problems and exacerbated them instead. Mugabe blamed most of Zimbabwe’s woes on the 
imperialists and wanted Britain to pay for the aftermath of its historical gross injustices. One of 
the misguided economic and fiscal policies enacted by the Mugabe regime was its vain attempt to 
control prices. In June 2007 businesses were ordered to cut their prices by 50 percent, and company 
executives and shopkeepers who failed to do so were arrested. Supermarkets soon emptied and 
manufacturing, which had already dropped 50% in the past decade collapsed further.  
Another economic catastrophe was the Central Bank’s mismanagement of the country’s 
currency. In the five years between July 2001 and July 2006, the Zimbabwean dollar lost 99.94% 
of its official value. The Governor of the Central Bank, surprisingly the same Mr. Gono that 
acknowledged widespread corruption, had devalued the currency by 24 percent in August 2000 to 
little avail and he responded to the continuing monetary crisis not by shoring up foreign reserves, 
using open market operations, or targeting interest rates but by slashing three zeroes off all 
currency in July 2006.113 At the same time he announced a 60& devaluation of the currency, which 
altered the exchange rate from Z$100,828 = US$1 to Z$250,000 = US$1. The removal of the ‘three 
zeroes’ left the official daily interbank exchange rate at Z$250 = US$1, making arbitrage and 
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abuses all too easy for those in the ruling elite. Part of Mr. Gono’s radical reforms was an 
announcement that old banknotes and bearer checks (issued during the 2003 cash crisis) would be 
demonetized on 21 August 2006, leaving anyone holding these old instruments three weeks to 
present them at banks for conversion and giving any overseas currency holders no chance to 
redeem any value from their old notes. Furthermore, the Central Bank launched various measure 
to try catch anyone suspected of hoarding cash, defined as Z$5 million in old money. In a country 
where a loaf of bread cost Z$1 million (at that time equivalent to US$9.92), anyone who had 
enough money to buy five loaves of bread was over the limit and subject to punitive measures. As 
a result, the day later authorities seized over Z$100,000 billion at borders as parties who had 
exported Zimbabwean dollars tried to re-import them ahead of the 21 August deadline. This 
devaluation had immediate negative effects: the Zimbabwean people were bewildered and even 
more mistrusting of the Zimbabwean dollar and the government backing it. On the ‘black’114 
market, the exchange rate fell from Z$100,828 = US$1 on 31 July to Z$650,000 = US$1 on 2 
August. One year later nearly all sectors of the economy had ceased to use the Zimbabwean dollar 
and the ‘three zeroes’ had reappeared. In August 2007, the ‘black’ market exchange rate was 
Z$400,000 = US$1, which had it not been for the 2006 removal of three digits, would have been 
more like Z$4,000,000 = US$1.115 
Foreign-exchange reserves had been negligible throughout the current crisis and at 31 
December 2005 they stood at US$24.8 million, enough to cover only six days’ worth of imports 
                                                          
114 The ‘black’ market refers to a parallel market or underground economy consisting of all commerce on which 
applicable taxes and/or regulations of trade are being avoided. They tend to exist in economies in major crisis where 
prices are too volatile for normal free market mechanism to function. 
115 The author was in Harare in July 2007 and witnessed the failure of the banking system first hand. No ATMs worked, 
credit cards were charged at the official exchange rates, which were at times ten times less favorable than the black 
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have technically been punishable as hoarding. 
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of goods and services. The 2006/2007 budget made no attempt to quantify gross international 
reserves. Export volume was still declining, by over 7 percent in 2005 and 2006.116 Moreover, the 
government seized profits from gold mines, leading to nationwide shutdowns. In November 2006, 
in what was called ‘Operation Chikorokoza Chapera’ (‘No to Illegal Mining’), people who were 
desperately looking for gold and other minerals were rounded up and sometimes beaten. 
The most recent round of Mugabe’s economic paranoia began in March 2008 with the 
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act, with potentially grave consequences for white 
entrepreneurs. It states that “indigenous Zimbabweans shall own at least 51 percent of the shares 
of every public company and other businesses” and would tacitly entitled a minister to transfer the 
majority share of any company – a garage, shop, factory, and, more significantly, a mine or a bank 
– owned by non-indigenous Zimbabweans to “any person who before 1980 was disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination on the grounds of his or her race, and any descendant of that person”.117 That 
effectively means nationalizing 51% of any white owned business and will cause even more whites 
to flee and deter any foreign capital away just to provide Mr. Mugabe with another method of 
reward for his loyalist and cronies. “This will entail the destruction of the economy” predicts 
Harare-based economist Godfrey Kanyenze but he adds that “those in power never learn and they 
repeat the same mistakes over and over again, expecting different results. This is insanity.”118 
Many observers would agree with Kanyenze but it’s hard to imagine that this will truly be the last 
act by Mugabe in a string of ill-timed, ill-conceived, racially motivated policies aimed at serving 
himself, his tribe and the political elites as the typology of a neopatrimonial state would predict. 
                                                          
116 See Figure 3 for an illustration of Zimbabwe’s rapid money supply growth. 
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The Act in fact incentivizes local businessmen to take action and take control of white businesses 
with the establishment of an economic empowerment board to “give loans to local individuals 
intending to acquire shares, start businesses or expand existing ventures”.  
 
4.6 Was Zimbabwe’s  HIV/AIDS problem to Blame? 
Some have pointed to Zimbabwe’s alarmingly high HIV/AIDS rate as an important cause 
in the country’s socio-economic and developmental woes. Although these health problems are 
significant they are not sufficient to have created or dictated the systematic collapse. A brief look 
at Botswana, Zimbabwe’s neighbor, will illustrate how a country with an even higher infection 
rate can adequately address the problems without any significant economic or political 
consequences.  
The infection rate in Zimbabwe reached 20.5%in 2006 and the scope of the problem has 
reached all tiers of society, including the infection of many cabinet members.119 There has been 
very little governmental effort made to address the problem and education about prevention and 
treatment are almost non-existent. As a result Zimbabwe’s infant mortality rate has remained 
around a poor level of 51 deaths per 1000 live births and over 150,000 Zimbabweans die as a result 
of the disease each year. Zimbabwe is not the only southern African country plagued by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic but it has done the worst job of dealing with the associated problems and 
tacitly allowing hundreds of thousands of its citizens to suffer.  
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The detrimental effects of such a high HIV infection rate on the economic and agriculture 
base of a country take the form of a diminished labor force, an increased demand for national 
health services and the onerous multiplier effect of having families without income producing 
parents or with sickly children. But even under these dire circumstances the AIDS epidemic cannot 
fully account for the agricultural, economic and political turmoil witnessed since 2000. As 
previously mentioned, Botswana has a higher infection rate, at 31%, but has effectively used 
government resources to build up health services and address the problems. Botswana had even 
more work to do because of its relatively weak education system but has managed to stabilize the 
spread of the disease and lead the way for southern African countries trying to fight this killer 
disease. Zimbabwe’s institutional collapse has paralyzed its ability to remedy its health crisis and 
prevented the state, which otherwise would have had the resources and knowhow, from being able 
to cure or mitigate the AIDs epidemic crippling the country.  
  
4.7 Was Zimbabwe’s Collapse  caused by the 2001/2002 Drought?120 
 The government for a long time blamed a severe drought in 2001/2002 on the food 
shortages and related economic failures. Convenient seeing as though the weather is out of the 
control of the Mugabe administration. The government appealed to international relief agencies in 
2001 for more aid and food to counteract the drop in agricultural production. The World Food 
Program agreed and surprisingly attributed the crisis to ‘bad weather, a shortage of key inputs such 
as fertilizers and tractors, the crumbling irrigation system and the disincentive effect of the price 
controls put in place’.121 However Zimbabwe’s dependence on rain is shown to have dramatically 
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diminished over the past decade and the severity of the drought was not as significant as the 
government suggested. Figure H (page 43) illustrates a string of turbulent rainy seasons in 
Zimbabwe’s history including multiple droughts, some of which were more severe than the 
2001/2002 drought and yet Zimbabwe’s economy remained stable. The difference from past 
droughts, when the agricultural system was organized well enough for commercial farmers – both 
large- and small-scale –to produce enough in good years to create sufficient reserves, was that 
many commercial farms had been confiscated by the Mugabe government since 2000, severely 
affecting crop yields With the virtual collapse of the agricultural infrastructure, thousands of farm 
laborers no longer had employment or food. Furthermore, the state had reformulated policy so that 
all cereal imports had to be processed through the Grain Marketing Board, a government controlled 
monopoly that fixed retail grain prices, further illustrating the abuses and misadministration by the 
Mugabe government.122 The severity of the drought is also a debated subject. The World Food 
Program (WFP) found, after multiple visits and reports, that the drought only lasted from January 
2002 to early April 2002 and that “it primarily affected the Southern districts”.123 Furthermore, 
most areas in the north received average rainfall and it these districts in which maize, the staple 
food of most Zimbabweans, is grown. 
 
Figure H:  Rainfall versus GDP growth: 1981-2003124 
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. 
From 1980 to 1999 the correlation between read GDP growth and rainfall was calculated 
to be 0.69. In other words, 69 percent of GDP growth was correlated with rainfall, giving an 
indication of just how important the agricultural sector was in driving the economy. With the 
economy sputtering at -0.7 percent growth in 1999, the link between GDP and rainfall then sharply 
disconnected in the year 2000, even as rainfall returned to above normal levels. Using Figure H 
(on previous page) one can infer a different conclusion than the IMF and the WFP regarding the 
20001/2002 crop season. In fact the amount of rainfall during the relatively short four month 
drought was just 22 percent below the 50-year average. There is no doubt that the four month 
drought caused devastation for communal farmers. However, to put primary blame on the drought 
for the sudden drop in overall agricultural and economic production, as Mugabe, the WFP and 
IMF had, misses some key points.125 
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4.8 Was Robert Mugabe’s Megalomaniac Presidency and Personality to Blame? 
When President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania arrived in Harare for the Zimbabwe 
independence celebrations on 18 April 1980, he greeted Prime Minister Robert Mugabe with the 
words, “You have inherited a jewel. Keep it that way”.126 The first decade or so Zimbabwe had 
become a darling of the international community and promised to be a shining example for sub-
Saharan Africa but Robert Mugabe soon proved to not be the role model that Zimbabweans had 
hoped for.127 Under his 28 year presidency the economy has shrunk on average by 1.9 percent 
annually and the national motto: “Unity, Freedom and Work” is a mockery since those three things 
have all but disintegrated.128 Nevertheless, the press attention and international criticism focused 
on Mr. Mugabe’s leadership might be too hasty and too harsh. Mugabe’s reign was self-serving 
and destructive but the roots of the problems lie much deeper and predate Mr. Mugabe’s 
presidency.  
While it must be accepted that Robert Mugabe was the source of many of the irrational and 
illegitimate decisions and maneuvers made by the Zimbabwean government, it would be 
presumptuous to think that one man can bring down an economy and a civil society, especially 
one with the resources and prospects that Zimbabwe had, single handedly without the state being 
partly culpable. Zimbabwe’s downfall had just as much to do with the centralization of power and 
violence in the hands of the ruling elite than it did with the president’s megalomaniac personality 
and dysfunctional leadership. The minority groups within the ruling class (war veterans, Ndebele 
chiefs, ZANU-PF cronies and corrupt officials) fueled much of the violence, oppression and 
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corruption and drove many of the policy changes across a variety of subjects. Therefore it was 
ZANU-PF’s neopatrimonial tendencies that lay the faulty groundwork for a state whose 
institutions were mismanaged and leveraged toward serving the ruling elite. Think of the president 
as being the driver of a car, which represents an entire country. Extending this metaphor, it was as 
if Mr. Mugabe steered Zimbabwe off a well paved highway towards success and took what he 
thought was a dirt road detour to appease some of the more important passengers and in doing so 
he get lost and the car broke down, now unable to get back on track. In this case institutions act 
like well laid roads with proper signposts and markings that constraint and guide drivers towards 
cooperative and optimal driving practices. Neopatrimonial states have a tendency to sacrifice these 
infrastructural necessities in setting national agendas and instead pursue the interests of just the 
driver (the ruling elite) at the expense of everyone in the car (the whole country). So although Mr. 
Mugabe was certainly not a very good driver, he never had the appropriate license to take his 
vehicle off-road and he failed to take responsibility for all of his passengers, the decision and blame 
to take the car off-course was not solely his nor was he solely capable of steering it back on-track 
once the car starting stalling on the dirt road.  
Robert Mugabe should shoulder a large burden of blame and responsibility for the despair 
and ruin endured by the Zimbabwean people during his leadership however it was not solely his 
fault. For argument’s sake, if he was completely removed from the equation in the 2005 election 
one might suspect that much of the mismanagement and institutional collapse would have been 
promulgated by a likely ZANU-PF his successor. His African sympathizers, like former Zambian 
leader Kenneth Kaunda, argue that the blame lies in the successive British colonial governments 
that preceded his rule. President Kuanda wrote in June 2007 that "leaders in the West say Robert 
Mugabe is a demon, that he has destroyed Zimbabwe and he must be got rid of - but this 
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demonizing is made by people who may not understand what Robert Gabriel Mugabe and his 
fellow freedom fighters went through."129 Similarly, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, 
responded to his critics by saying that Zimbabwe's problems are the legacy of colonialism. The 
true test may only come when Mugabe is gone from power but the problems are much too complex 
and pervasive to lay all the blame on one man. 
 
4.9 Is there a road to recovery?  
The fortunes of Zimbabwe have, for more than two and a half decades, been tied to 
President Robert Mugabe. Perhaps now that Zimbabwean’s have managed to loosen his grip on 
the country, if not remove him completely from the political arena, their fortunes and futures seem 
brighter. Zimbabwe will need to fix its broken institutions beginning with its worthless currency 
and couple that shift with major reforms in the legal, economic and political systems. Thankfully, 
history has also shown that recovery is possible.130 
One road to recovery requires revolutionary changes. “Zimbabwe needs a serious 
revolution” according to Craig Richardson and he envisions it as “a legal one and not one that is 
imposed by force”.131 More specifically, it needs to reestablish a system of legal, extralegal and 
customary practices that rests on the aspirations and sense of fairness of the majority. This legal 
revolution is the only way that an economic revolution can occur, which is vital in bringing 
confidence and sustenance back to the majority of Zimbabweans. To reverse the root of the current 
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problems an integrated system of private property rights, that makes physical possession of assets 
possible for all citizens as well as enforcing those rights, must be reformulated.  
This theory is reaffirmed by the lessons learned halfway around the globe in a small South 
America country two decades ago. Nicaragua experienced much the same devastation as 
Zimbabwe after its own land reform movement in the early 1980s – hyperinflation, crashing GDP 
growth, and a tremendous decline in wealth. Yet within five years after the election of a moderate 
government, Nicaragua’s economy began to flourish again from the midst of rubble. With a new 
set of pro-market policies and reforms adopted a strict restoration a property rights system and in 
collaboration with international aid agencies, the economy and the political institutions recovered 
and are back on track to prosperity. The point being that if regime change is fluid, proactive, pro-
market, and internationally supported it is possible to reverse the almost fatal damage done by the 
Mugabe administration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: Getting your Philosophy, Politics 
and Economics Wrong 
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To say that Zimbabwean policy makers did not know what the consequences of their 
actions would be unfair nevertheless even an elementary student of philosophy, politics or 
economics knows enough about the fundamental concepts of utility, due process, democracy and 
distributive justice to worry about the dangerous game the Mugabe regime was playing. By 
perverting and destroying ‘the cooperative and competitive relationships, which constitute a 
society and an economic order’ the government of Zimbabwe reset the rules, compliance 
procedures and ethical norms with horrific results.132 Despite being in better shape than most 
African counties and having a brighter future than all of its neighbors in the early 1990s, this 
sinking Titanic now threatens to bring its neighbors down along with it. This research has explored 
the multiple levels of state failures and their domino effects and addressed Mugabe’s Presidency, 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic and other supplementary reasons for Zimbabwe’s collapse. As Lord 
Acton said in 1887, “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” and the Mugabe 
government, with its structural imbalances and faulty construction, has reaffirmed this maxim over 
the past decade.133 Even though recovery has been shown to be possible, the structural changes 
and distortions experienced by Zimbabwe over the past two decades provide an all too coarse and 
distressing account of how and why economic, political and moral decay began and how deep and 
ingrained the problems are that Zimbabwe faces.134  
                                                          
132 North, Douglas, C, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: Norton, 1981, pg 201 
133 The second part could interestingly also be applied to Zimbabwe as it says that “All great men are bad men”. 
Many proclaimed Mugabe as great until his reign began and his maliciousness was uncovered. 
134 North, 201 
Rafael Burde 
May, 2008 
 
55 | P a g e  
 
This case study of Zimbabwe teaches us how a neopatrimonial state, tribalism and 
nearsighted policies can lead a country down a slippery slope that can quickly become irreversible 
and disastrous. Ultimately, the political elite were never able to overcome the original deficiencies 
and inequalities of state construction135 and they simply went from crisis to crisis, both controlling 
and wasting the society’s scarce developmental resources cloaked under ideological and nationalist 
agendas. Ultimately, the misguided agricultural and economic policies were the first dominos in a 
chain of events at the institutional level, which affected every aspect of society and led to 
Zimbabwe’s inability to remain internationally competitive or domestically stable. Free market 
frameworks collapsed due to a lack of trust, liquidity and the rule of law forcing billions in capital 
and millions of people over Zimbabwe’s borders. Developing countries have much to learn about 
the balancing act between the interests of the ruling elite and overall sound institutional design in 
which their citizens must interact. Governmental tampering with institutions and policies is a 
dangerous game when decisions are misguided, actors uninformed and agendas self-serving. Let 
the lesser developed world take a closer look at the institutional nature of Zimbabwe’s collapse so 
as to promote more productive, cooperative and ethical states with better understandings of the 
philosophical, political and economic implications of their actions.  
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 A.1 – Geography and Neighbors 
 
A.2 – Recent Photograph of Robert Mugabe, 18 January, 2008, African Union 
Summit, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
 
Source: Sgt. Jeremy Lock (USAF) 
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Colonization
UDI & 
Civil War
Independence Disintegration
A.3 Timeline and snapshot of major 
periods in Zimbabwe’s history
1880 2008200019801965
• Rhodesia          Southern Rhodesia               Republic of Rhodesia      Republic of ZimbabweNational Title
• BSAC (Rhodes)                British Crown (UK Colony)                             ZANU-PF; Mugabe (Independent) 
Political
Sovereign
• Reasonable (>3%)                        Steady  (< 5%)                Very Strong (8-10%)               Disastrous (<-10%)
Economic (GDP) 
Growth
Source: World Bank,  Europa Regional Surveys,  The Statesman Yearbook 2006 , UNDP 2006
 
Independence Disintegration
Timeline and snapshot of major policy 
changes in Zimbabwe’s history
1980 200820001992
Source: World Bank,  Europa Regional Surveys,  The Statesman Yearbook 2006, various others sources
2005
• Willing Buy-Willing Seller       Land Acquisition Act         Forced removals                ‘Operation Murambatsvina’Land related 
policies
• Currency Revaluation     Price Controls
• ‘Operation Chikorokoza Chapera’
• Dropping ‘three zeroes’
Fiscal & 
Economic  
Policies
• Indigenization and Economic Empowerment ActOther Policies
 
Rafael Burde 
May, 2008 
 
58 | P a g e  
 
 A.4 – Clipping from Zimbabwe Independent, June 15th, 2007 
 
 A.5 – Commercial versus seized land; a juxtaposition (neighboring farms in Harare) 
 
 
1 A export producing farm 
 
2 A neighboring derelict seized farm 
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 A.6 – Currency (as of July 2007) 
 
(Not only is this currency now expired but also at the time that the author was in Harare, July 2007, 
this ZD$100,000 note was worth roughly US$0.75 based on the black market exchange rate) 
 
(Note that this is not currency like we are used to in Western stable markets; this is simply a 
temporary ‘bearer cheque’ backed by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe for finite 5 month period 
and it is illegal to take any ‘currency’ outside the currency out of fears of ‘hoarding’ – the author  
smuggled these examples out of the country) 
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